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1. Introduction 
The remunicipalisation of public services in OECD states is the emerging 
practice of retrieving previously privatized and outsourced properties and services of 
public interest at the municipal level. This process can be understood as a 
countermovement to the paradigm of privatisation that had dominated the approach 
to public service delivery since the 1980’s (Ambrosius, 2012, p. 85). However, the 
anticipated benefits of privatising public services, mainly a financial relief for 
municipalities in conjunction with a decrease of consumer prices and increase of 
service quality, were only achieved to a limited extent. (Libbe, 2013, p. 18-20). The 
increased awareness of privatisation related downsides and issues such as prices 
increases; technical failures and default of provision; and a lack of an public service 
ethos among private providers has placed the topic of remunicipalisation on the 
political agenda. The “backswing of the pendulum” (Wollmann,2013a, p. 2) and the 
proclaimed „renaissance of public economic activity“ (Dickertmann,2012, p. 307) is 
thus not surprising and has been well documented in numerous individual case 
studies.  
Nevertheless, the current state of research into the topic of remunicipalisation 
of public services is far from being extensive or explicit with regards to the 
ascertainment of an empirical trend of remunicipalisation and an inquiry into the 
underlying causes and actors within the political system.  Attempts to identify the 
causes (e.g financial opportunities) and the driving actors (e. g the municipal 
government or the individual citizens) have been case specific and detailed; confined 
to certain sectors of public services; and/or lack concision with regards to identifying 
the main causes. It is thus unanswered if, or to what extent, the cases of 
remunicipalisation of public services in OECD are essentially based on an 
analytically reducible, hence a simplified, number of common causes and actors that 
are pushing for remunicipalisation.  
The primary aim of this paper will therefore be to investigate the possibility of 
the existence of such common causes and actors by establishing a descriptive, 
empirically based typology of remunicipalisation. The typology, by means of 
constructing and describing the types of remunicipalisation will therefore contribute 
towards the social-scientific understanding of remunicipalisation by analytically 
simplifying its complex and diverse reality. The functional reduction of the vast 
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amount of information, with reference to causes and actors, that is derivable from 
empirical examples of remunicipalisation, is therefore the main contribution of the 
typology and this paper. A subordinate aim of the typology will be to evaluate any 
possibly detected correlations between the dimension of “actor” and “cause”, thus 
utilizing it as a heuristic device for making careful assumptions about the underlying 
mechanisms that connect a certain reason, hence causes for remunicipalisation and 
the actor that perpetuates it.  
The paper will be commenced with a brief, but necessary definition of 
“remunicipalisation” and “public services”, as those are the main objects of this 
investigation. In the following, an equally concise overview of the current state of 
research will be given and used to explain the necessity and value of this typology of 
remunicipalisation.  Thirdly, the methodology used to construction he typology will be 
displayed with reference to the concept of “property space” developed by Barton and 
Lazarsfeld (cited in Kelle, 1999, p. 92-111). Most importantly, the descriptive 
typology of remunicipalisation and each of its six types will be displayed, explained 
and illustrated with empirical examples. Moreover, the description of each of the six 
type of remunicipalisation will entail a brief, therefore only preliminary, analysis into 
the underlying mechanisms, such as the relationship between the dimension of 
“cause” and “actor” that led to the existence of this type in the first place. Case 
studies will be employed throughout the entire paper in order to expose the 
underlying details that have been used to derive this simple, functional and concise 
typology of remunicipalisation.   
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2. Definitions and object of investigation 
 
Defining the term “remunicipalisation”, thus specifying its constituent 
elements, is necessary to delimitate the phenomenon from others such as 
municipalisation or nationalisation. Moreover, a precise definition clarifies the object 
of investigation of the following typology, thus clearly stating its scope and purpose. 
Researchers have yet to agree on a dissociation from terms such as “insourcing” 
(Schaefer and Theuvsen, 2012, p. 11) or “social re-appropriation” (Hachfeld, 2008, p. 
2). It remains unclear whether those terms are synonymous or actually label a 
different process. Schaefer and Theuvsen even argue that the lack of a clear 
definition is a main reason for the non-existence of generalizable empirical studies 
into the question whether a trend towards remunicipalisation exists or not (2012, p. 
11).  
 I will employ a broad definition of remunicipalisation as the following typology 
seeks to establish a rather general, all-embracing description and analysis of 
remunicipalisation, thus capturing its diverse and heterogeneous nature. The 
typology might be criticised for being imprecise with regards to the object of 
investigation. On the other hand, it achieves a higher degree of generalizability, thus 
can be applied to current and upcoming cases of remunicipalisation that slightly 
differ in terms of the legal business entities of the public services or the exact 
methods of privatising and/or outsourcing the public services in the first place.  
The common definitions will be reduced to the following, simple criteria: First, 
a transformation from private ownership of assets and provision services into 
municipal ownerships and direct municipal provision has had to occur (Hall, Lobina 
and Terhorst,2013, p. 194; Halmer and Hauenschild,2012, p. 10-22). The 
transformation into a private, but municipally owned business entity (e.g GmbH or 
Ltd) would therefore be included in this broad definition of remunicipalisation, as the 
municipality has a de-facto, though not de-jure, control over the provision of the 
public service. Second, the respective property and/or service has had to be owned 
and/or provided by a municipality before its privatisation, hence the term “re”-
municipalisation. (Lenk, Rottmann and Hesse, 2012, p. 164). A survey among 152 
German municipalities, though not representative for municipalities in other OECD 
countries, finds that an overwhelming majority of municipalities agree with this rather 
straightforward definition (Institut für den öffentlichen Sektor e.V, 2011, p. 2). The so 
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called “insourcing” or “retransferring”, the process where a municipality takes a 
service back in-house, e.g costumer services or waste collection, that had always 
been controlled by the municipality, but executed in an operative sense by a private 
subcontractor, will also be subsumed under the term remunicipalisation. Others, 
however, contest this definition, arguing that the service had always been under 
control and responsibility of the municipality, therefore rendering the usage of the 
term “remunicipalisation” inappropriate. (Verbücheln,2009, p. 3). The fact that such 
services, e.g social housing management (Birch, 2011), IT-service (Ballard, 2012), 
waste disposal (Verbücheln,2009,) have been retransferred to direct municipal 
control and operation due to the same reasons, e.g. economical considerations and 
operative failures, as the more definite cases of remunicipalisation, supports the 
method of treating all these cases as comparable enough to include them in the 
construction of the typology.   
The second important definition regards the rather vague concept of a “public 
service”. Popular definitions are based on the idea of services that are of collective 
economic interest (Halmer and Hauenschild,2012 p. 6), hence delivering services or 
goods that are essential, but would be underprovided in a free market. Moreover, 
services and goods have a certain “public” concern to them if the generate positive 
or negative externalities for society (Weimar and Vining, 2005, pp. 91-97). The 
concept of natural monopolies, pertaining goods such as water delivery in a single 
water network, which do not allow for market competition, (Ramesh and Araal ,2010, 
p. 7) or politically and societally determined minimum standards such as access 
health care and sanitation, are also used to classify a good or service to be “public”. 
The European commission’s definition summarizes that public services are 
“economic activities that the public authorities identify as being of particular 
importance to citizens and that would not be supplied (or would be supplied under 
different conditions) if there were no public intervention” (European Commission). 
 In line with the abovementioned focus on generalizability, the term “public 
services” will be interpreted broadly. This seems necessary as there is a perceived, 
conceptual difference of the public services between OECD countries (Wollman and 
Marcou, 2010, p. 1-4). Agreement prevails with regard to “local public services such 
as water supply, sewage disposal, energy supply, public transport, and waste 
collection and treatment” (Wollman and Marcou,2010, p. 2). However, services such 
as social housing or public swimming pools could also be considered to be located 
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within the public domain (Bauer, 2012, p. 21-22). Limiting the typology by means of 
utilizing a strict, narrow definition of a public service would not fulfil the declared aim 
of constructing a broad,generalizable typology of remunicipalisation in OECD 
countries. Moreover, it is legitimately claimed that no objective criteria of a public 
service exist, but that the establishment of such is based on the formation of the 
political will within each society (Halmer and Hauenschild, 2012, p. 6; Menger and 
Müller-Kirschenbauer, 2012, p. 54). The bottom line being, that every case of 
remunicipalisation will be included in the typology, in which the municipal 
government and or/the civic society regain control over a service that they claim, 
according to their own definition, to be of public nature and collective concern. The 
typology, in this regard, thus remains strictly empirical and does not make an indirect 
normative judgment about what constitutes a public service through excluding 
arguably ambiguous cases such as the remunicipalisation of the culture and tourism 
service in Rome (European Union-EPSU, 2008, p. 50-51). Any case will be included 
as long as arguments and justifications are based on the notion of common goods 
and/or public interests. It is likely, that this requirement coincides with the second 
criteria for the usage of the term “remunicipalisation”, as stated above, since a 
service that once had been municipal was probably so because society had ascribed 
a public concern to it.   
 
3. Current state of research and the value of a typology of 
remunicipalisation  
 
The social scientific endeavour of describing and analysing the 
remunicipalisation of public services is in its early stages. Libbe asserts that topic 
has merely been discussed for 5 years (2013, p. 18). This doesn’t surprise seeing 
that most instances of remunicipalisation have been carried out within the new 
century. Thus even the empirical evidence supporting the claim of a trend towards 
remunicipalisation has been highly inconclusive until very recently. Currently, trends 
towards remunicipalisation, hence, a lasting development, can be identified in 
several OECD countries within different public service sectors. “In Germany, there 
has been a major expansion of direct municipal provision of public services (…) most 
striking in the energy sector” (Hall,2012, p. 4 ). Additionally, the waste management 
sector in Germany is becoming increasingly re-municipalised (Bauer, 2010, p. 74; 
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Verbücheln, 2009, Libbe, 2013), though it is pointed out that the number of cases 
have increased in this sector, but not to the extent justifying a “trend” (Source Halmer 
and Hauenschild, 2012, p. 25). Following the development are the water and 
wastewater sector in France (Hall, 2012, p. 25; Höffler, 2013, p. 77-78). Moreover, 
previously outsourced services such as waste collection and community housing 
management within municipalities in the UK are also being re-municipalized 
(Wollman, 2013b, p. 44-45). Despite the abovementioned sector confined examples 
of trends, researchers can and do not claim a service and country overlapping 
“trend” of remunicipalisation. Libbe, a leading researcher of remunicipalisation in 
Germany, agrees that there is no “thorough overview” (cited in Berlo and Wagner, 
2013, p.6).  
  The current state of research into the causes and actors of remunicipalisation 
can only be described as even more fragmented and incomplete. Case studies of 
remunicipalisation exist for the water provision in Hamilton (Ohnmeg, and 
Grant,2008), Paris (Pigeon, 2012b), Grenoble (Hall and Lobina, 2001) and Potsdam 
(Hachfeld, 2008); waste disposal in Bergkamen (Schäfer, 2012); assets such as the 
electricity grid in German municipalities (Taschner, 2013, p. 173-181); and other 
public services such as social housing in the UK (Birch, 2011; Ballard, 2012). These 
and other studies often include an analysis into the causes of remunicipalisation; the 
role of actors such as trade unions, the civil society and local municipal 
governments; different outcomes for the state and consumers; and the legal 
framework, but are limited to a one or very few cases within a specific sector.  A few 
studies attempt to make generalized statements on the common causes and actors 
of remunicipalisation and name a vast variety of reasons such as efficiency and 
costs, public service objectives such as accessibility, high transaction cost for 
monitoring of private providers, a desire for revenue from profits, employment 
considerations, desire for municipal control (Hall, 2012; Halmer and Hauenschild, 
2012).  
However, the studies, and thus the current state of knowledge, are 
unsatisfactory in three main regards. The typology will attempt to eradicate the 
following weaknesses and therefore advance the research into the novel 
phenomenon of remunicipalisation in three corresponding ways:  
First, the limited number of cases used to derive conclusions about 
remunicipalisation and the focus on specific sectors inherently limits the 
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generalizability of the conclusions. One must note, that the numerous individual case 
studies are valuable, and can serve as a first theoretical conjecture about the 
underlying causes and actors. Moreover, they will serve as secondary sources and 
thus ease the laborious construction of such an elaborate typology. Including all well-
know and another diverse range of cases from as many OECD countries and sectors 
as possible, will therefore provide a more generalizable, all-embracing description 
and analysis of remunicipalisation than previous papers.  
Second, studies deriving common causes of remunicipalisation from individual 
cases (Hall, 2012; Halmer and Hauenschild, 2013) do not aspire to analytically 
merge similar causes, but rather resort to simply listing and describing them one by 
one. This great attention to detail inherently renders the current summative 
descriptions of remunicipalisation to be unclear and non-functional.  A potential 
theory of remunicipalisation, which this paper does not seek to establish, will have to 
reduce the number of property values, hence the categories, in order to remain 
functional and of analytical value for later empirical research. Later empirical 
research on e.g. the degree of success of remunicipalisation, will have to resort to 
suitable, and manageable categories and types, in order to evaluate e.g why some 
cases of remunicipalisation might be more successful than others.  This typology of 
remunicipalisation, conceiving of it as an intermediate step between the empirical 
analysis of individual case studies and the development of a corresponding, 
generalizable theory (Kelle, 1999, p. 76), will seek to aggregate and reduce the 
dimension of “actor” and “cause”, making it as simplistic and concise as possible. It 
does therefore primarily fulfil the descriptive purpose of structuring a complex 
societal and political reality through the principle of reduction of information as 
demanded by methodologist employing and utilizing typologies (Kelle, 1999, p. 42-43 
and 74; Sodeur 1974, p.24-27).  
Third, the abovementioned studies do not describe or analyse the relationship 
between the dimension of “cause” and “actor” of remunicipalisation. They accurately 
list and describe many causes, but fail to analyse how certain actors might push and 
perpetuate remunicipalisation for their own, very specifics gains and agendas. 
Attempts to analyse this relationship can be found in analysis of the civic society in 
Germany (Taschner, 2013) and the usage of cross-subsidization between public 
service sectors by local governments (Höffler et al, p. 81-82), but remain either 
superficial or case- and sector specific, and are thus isolated in the sense that they 
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are not embedded in a complete framework or theory which includes all possible 
actors and sectors. Hence, a lack of comparative analysis can be noted.  A recently 
published book on remunicipalisation of water services summarizes that “discussions 
of remunicipalisation have been energetic but anecdotal, with little understanding of 
the commonalities between various experiments and no clear research 
methodologies (…)” (McDonald,2012, p. 9). The following typology will therefore fill 
this gap by means of creating an empirically based, but simplified, exhaustive 
common property space of the dimensions “actor” and “cause” which allows for a 
grouping of cases and an analysis into the similarities and differences between 
certain cases, hence the establishment of descriptive “types” of remunicipalisation. In 
addition, any possible correlation between the two dimension of “actor” and “cause”, 
can be evaluated assuming that the relationship is not random, but causal to some 
extent. Already Weber emphasized the importance of understanding these inner 
relationships in the process of conceiving a relevant typology with a high information 
content (Kelle, 1999, p. 45-47). The typology, in addition to the descriptive purpose, 
will therefore also be of heuristic value in regards to understanding the relationship 
between the cause for remunicipalisation and the actor who pushes it. Certain 
common characteristics of the cases within one type can be compared with the same 
characteristics of cases in another type, thus hinting at the existence of confounding 
variables impacting the classification of cases into a certain type (Soduer,1974, p. 
29; Kelle, 1999, p. 109).  Thus, the paper will not only establish, hence describe, the 
types of remunicipalisation, but also aspire to make careful assumptions why certain 
types can be found in the first place, thou this aim is clearly secondary seeing the 
limited scope of this paper.  The description of empirical types itself will be of primary 
concern.  
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4. Methodology  
 
The methodology used in the construction of the typology will have to be in 
accordance with both its descriptive and heuristic aims, though the structuring and 
reduction of information is clearly the primary goal of this typology. The methodology 
for the construction of the typology is based on the rather simple, but effective 
approach by Barton and Larzarsfeld which utilizes the concept of property space to 
derive and visualize types (McKinney, 1970, p. 257-258; Kelle, 1999, p. 92-111). The 
following steps have been undertaken in order establish this descriptive typology of 
remunicipalisation: 
 
1. In a first step, two relevant dimensions of the phenomenon of 
remunicipalisation, the “cause” and the “actors”, were chosen. These two 
dimensions were not chosen randomly or purely empirically, hence through a 
first, superficial analysis of the individual cases, but were instead based on 
the current state of research.  Comparing sector specific case studies of 
remunicipalisation one notices that the aims and reasons behind the decision 
for remunicipalisation are diverse and contentious. The dimension of “cause” 
therefore constitutes a relevant property, which’s structuring, description and 
analysis is essential for the overall understand of the phenomenon of 
remunicipalisation. This also applies to the dimension of “actors”.  The pre-
existing state of knowledge on remunicipalisation thus therefore 
predetermines the scope of the typology.   
 
2. In a second step, a suitable quantity of cases of remunicipalisation of public 
services from OECD countries were selected. The case selection did not aim 
at obtaining a representative sample. Any detected distribution of elements 
(cases) within the property space, which will be used to make careful 
assumptions about the preferences of certain actors in relation to a certain 
cause, will therefore only hint at possible correlation. Selecting cases was 
rather done with a focus on including a diverse number of cases. This has 
been done, as the declared aim of this typology is to provide a general, 
simplified description of the phenomena of remunicipalisation. The types 
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constructed are therefore supposed to represent all possible forms of 
remunicipalisation that exist in reality. 
 
3. Third, the cases of remunicipalisation were compared and contrasted with 
reference to the property “cause” and “actor”. All possible variations of the 
property, hence the concrete nominal value, were recorded.  New cases were 
analysed until no new variation of the property “cause” or “actor” could be 
found. The method of comparing and contrasting case until no new 
knowledge is derived from the analysis of further cases, hence the arrival at a 
point of saturation, is inspired by Gerhard (cited in Kelle, 1999, p. 123). In the 
end, this resulted in the analysis of 30 cases of remunicipalisation. This 
method of case selection and analysis is therefore the best possible estimate, 
though no guarantee, of uncovering all possible variations of the property 
“cause” and “actor”, thus the construction of an exhaustive property space 
that represents the diversity of different remunicipalisation cases. The concept 
of the property space is of advantage as its construction is systematic and 
transparent.  
 
 
4. The property space, hence all possible combinations of variations of the 
properties “cause” and “actor”, also referred to as parameter values,  was 
then simplified and condensed through the mode of “reduction” (Barton and 
Lazarsfeld cited in Kelle,1999, p. 100-107).  The great number of different 
underlying causes of remunicipalisation, if not merged, would lead to dozens 
of groups, hence types of remunicipalisation. This would be in opposition to 
the prescribed aim of reducing complexity. An example of the inherent trade-
off between functional reduction and the empirical precision can be found in 
the description and analysis of Type 4 in this paper. In the end, the property 
“cause” was reduced to three nominal categories:  operative failures; 
economic and financial considerations; and ideological aims.  The property 
“actor” was reduced to “the citizens and the civic society” on the one hand and 
“the municipal government and administration” on the other. Obviously, the 
relationship between the two is not dichotomous as they lack mutual 
exclusivity. There is the theoretical possibility that both actors strive and push 
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for remunicipalisation simultaneously. In practice however, it seems that it is 
rather one, while the other is either inactive or even opposed.  Moreover, the 
declared goal of reducing complexity is better met when operationalizing the 
property of “actor” as only having two possible variations. The focus is on 
simplicity and functionality rather than precision and complexity.  
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5. The typology and its types 
 
           The typology constructed will be displayed employing the concept of property 
space. The individual six types will be described using illustrative, best fit empirical 
case studies which will be analysed in regards to the relationship between the 
“cause” and the “actor” of remunicipalisation, thus making careful assumptions of 
how and why these types, hence the combination of parameter values, have come to 
exist in reality.  
 
Table 1: Six types of remunicipalisation 
 Cause/ Actor  
Citizens and Civic 
Society  
Municipal government and 
administration 
Operative failure  
Type 1: Significant 
technical failure. Citizen 
pushing for 
remunicipalisation due to 
governments’ inactivity. 
Operative failure significant 
enough to be made public 
and taken on by the media.  
 
Type 2: Significant technical 
failures and inability of private 
provider through insolvency. 
Government acting as safety net 
to ensure provision of essential 
service.  
Economic 
Type 3:  Citizens and 
Consumers reacting to 
price rises and private 
profits. Role of corruption.  
Type 4: Government reacting to 
price rises and private profits. 
Government also using efficient 
public provision to reduce cost 
for municipal budget and to 
using public ownership of 
services and assets to extract 
profit for municipal budget. 
Ideological 
Type 5: Highly organized 
citizen initiatives motivated 
through environmental 
gains of remunicipalisation, 
use of renewable energy. 
Use of referendum to 
enforce against will of 
government. Examples 
confined to energy sector.     
Type 6:  Government promoting 
local, high quality employment 
and renewable energy.   
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Table 2: Distribution of cases in property space 
 
 
 
 Cause/ Actor  
Citizens and Civic 
Society  
Municipal government and 
administration 
Operative failure  
Type 1  Hamilton (Water), Type 2: Wales (Public Health); 
Umkirch (Energy);  Atlanta 
(Water), London (Public 
Transport), Antalya (Water) 
Economic 
Type 3:  Bordeaux (Water); 
Grenoble (Water); 
Type 4:  Paris (Water); 
Berkamen (Waste disposal); 
Düren (Street lighting); Samur 
(Public Transport), Nürnberg 
(Public Spaces and Parks), 
Hannover (Public Buildings and 
related services) 
Sheffild+Islington (Council 
(Community Housing); 
Sommerset (IT Services) 
Landkreis Böblingen+ Lüneburg 
(Waste management), 
Saarbrücken (Waste and 
Water), Münsterland 
(Electricity); Budapest 
(Hungary); Pecs 
(Hungary); Potsdam (Water); 
Ideological 
Type 5:  Boulder (Energy), 
Hamburg (Energy); Berlin 
(Energy), (Schönau) 
(Energy) 
Type 6:  Kiel (Public Transport); 
Rome (Culture and Tourism), 
Tübingen (Energy), Ledove 
(Waste disposal) 
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Type 1: Civic society campaigning and pressuring for remunicipalisation due 
to operational failures of private providers of public services 
 
This type is defined through the actor, the civic society, pushing for 
remunicipalisation in response to operational failures in the provision of a service.  
Theoretically, it is possible to imagine citizens and public service users pressuring 
the municipal government into remunicipalisation as a mean of securing an adequate 
provision and delivery of the public service. However, of all the cases analysed, only 
one fits this type: the remunicipalisation of the public service of water provision in 
Hamilton, Canada. The case will be illustrated in the following to explain the 
circumstances that had to occur in order for the civic society to become as heavily 
involved in the process of remunicipalisation.   
The service had originally been privatized as a mean of cutting cost for the 
municipality of Hamilton and to attract private funding and investment into the water 
and sewage infrastructure (Pigeon, 2012b, p. 77). However, a serious number of 
technical failures and problems contested the idea that the private provider was 
capable of handling the water and sewage network according to the municipalities’ 
expectations. PUMC, the private water company, reduced staff and operated at 
“maximum environmental dangerous thresholds” (Hoath cited in Ohmeng and Grant, 
2008, p. 484), thus demonstrating that a focus on shareholder value and profit can 
lead to significant negative externalities. As a result, the chemical pollution levels in 
Hamilton’s harbour increased and the number of sewage spills rose significantly 
(Piegon, M. 2012a, p. 78). Employees complained about “unreliable and out-dated 
equipment, deterioration of the plant conditions, health and safety concerns to 
employees and the public” (Hoath cited in Ohmeng and Grant, 2008, p. 484). The by 
far most dangerous and costly failure was a historically unique spill of raw sewage 
water which affected the entire area and necessitated the evacuation of a hospital 
(Piegon, M. 2012a, p. 78).  
The involvement of the civic society was essentially trigged by the refusal of 
the municipal government to engage in remunicipalisation or somehow solve the 
problem in a different manner. This type is therefore in stark contrast to the cases in 
Type 2, where the municipal governments and authorities were able to rectify the 
technical and operative failures of private providers without the public pressure them 
into doing so.  The public-private partnership contract with PUMC phased out in 
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2004 and thus provided an opportunity for the government and the council to 
reconsider. However, the senior city officials proposed the renewal of the contract 
based on the exact same arguments, such as a greater efficiency and expertise, as 
during the initial privatisation. The city council then voted to renew the contract and 
launch a new tendering process (Piegon, M. 2012a, p. 80). The subsequent publics’ 
dissatisfaction, with peaked with the disruption and direct action against a city 
council meeting (Ohmeng and Grant, 2008, p. 487) was only the beginning and was 
followed by the mobilization of citizens, non-governmental organizations and trade 
unions. The “Hamilton Water Watch Committee”, which unified representatives from 
numerous environmental NGO’s, experts and concerned citizens was founded as 
direct result. The initiative, after unsuccessfully urging the council to revote on the 
issue, then pursued the strategy of pressing for a strict tendering process. They 
collected data and evaluated the municipal liabilities under a public-private provision, 
(Piegon, M. 2012a, p. 81).  Summarizing, the initiative is credited with “putting 
pressure on the city to consider costs and liabilities seriously”, thus having 
“contributed to making the tender economically unattractive for private operators” 
(Piegon, M. 2012a, p. 83). The water and sewage provision was re-municipalized 
shortly after the unsuccessful tendering process. (Ohmeng and Grant, 2008, p. p. 
488).   
The remunicipalisation of water provision in Hamilton therefore reveals that 
citizens and consumers do not accept a continuation of such drastic technical 
failures of the services and thus pressure to municipal government into re-
municipalising. Two conditions for the involvement of citizens can be derived with 
regards to this case. First of all, the technical difficulties and failures of the private 
provider need to be serious and spectacular enough, such as the sewage spill in 
Hamilton, in order to be covered in media and thus create a suitable degree of 
salience of the issue within the public debate.  Second, the involvement of citizens 
and consumers in Hamilton was only possible due to the perceived inability of the 
municipal government to present a suitable solution to the problem.  The Hamilton 
Water Watch Council would not have been founded if the council had opted for 
remunicipalisation after the out-phasing of the concession contract.  The divergent 
viewpoints between elected representatives and individual citizens, though it is 
unclear of how many exactly, are thus what separates this case from the cases in 
Type 2.     
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Type 2: Municipal governments reacting to operation failure of private 
providers of public services  
 
These cases have in common, are thus empirically typified, through the fact 
that remunicipalisation was mainly caused by an operational failure in the provision 
of the public service by a private provider, which was recognized by the local 
authority and municipality and de-facto forced it to regain control in order to prevent 
significant harm or disruption of essential services.  This type can be found across 
different sectors of public services such as Water Provision (Atlanta), Public 
Transport (London), Health Care (Wales) and Electricity grids (Umkirch).  The 
remunicipalisation of water services in Atlanta and the cancelling and insourcing of 
maintenance and electronic systems of the London Tube, will serve as empirical, 
representative cases in order to better describe and illustrate this type, show inner 
homogeneity of the type and, secondly, analyse the relationship between the 
dimensions of cause and actor, thus explain why significant operational failures are 
likely to be encountered by the local governments and authorities rather than through 
engagement of the civic society as in Type 1.  
The city of Atlanta originally privatized the fresh water provision and the waste 
water treatment due to financial constraints, such as many other US cities in the 
1990’s. United Water was responsible for the operation, management and 
maintenance of both fresh and sewage water supply and infrastructure. The city of 
Atlanta and the public, though initially saving money, eventually faced a serious of 
operational failures that lead to the mutually agreed ending of the contract. United 
Water was assessed to be slow and unresponsive with regards to fixing broken 
pipes and numerous water main breaks (Jehl, 2003), had to issue water boiling 
alerts, only managed to install less than 10 % of the newly required water meters, 
(Ohmeng and Grant, 2009, p. 12) and last but not least, run an inefficient and faulty 
billing system that resulted in considerable financial losses (Remunicipalisation 
Tracker, 2008). United Water presented an equally dire performance in other US 
cities, such as Camden, New Jersey. An average of 45 % of water was lost due to 
leaking pipes; independent auditors were incapable of locating the assets that United 
Water was supposed to maintain according to the contracts, and the ones located 
were in a nearly in-operational and derelict state; and missing and incomplete data 
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on customers resulted in considerable losses for both Suez and the municipality 
(Hall, Lobina, p. 4). Last but not least, the private providers handling of emergencies 
regarding the provision in Atlanta was “consistently and habitually inadequate and 
potentially hazardous” (Food and Water Watch, 2008, p. 14). The remunicipalisation 
of the water provision in Atlanta, in the end, resulted in a considerably more 
expensive system, with estimates for infrastructure repairs being in the billions. (Jehl, 
2003). Nevertheless, the city’s commissioner of watershed management concluded 
that “I think we’ve learned enough to know that we’d prefer to see the city in charge 
of that destiny” (Jehl, 2003). Hence, despite being burdened by considerable cost, 
the municipal government decided to re-municipalize in order to rectify the failures of 
United Water and secure the unobstructed provision of water. The drawbacks of 
having to invest public funds, instead of relying on private investment through private 
provision as originally intended, were acceptable in comparison to the clearly 
inadequate quality of service. This case is thus clearly different from those in Type 4, 
in which the municipality actually financially profited from remunicipalisation.  
The city of London had also opted for private sector participation, in form of 
Public-Private Partnerships (PPP), in the hope of reducing the maintenance cost of 
the tube network and an electronic ticketing system. However, it became clear that 
they were equally incapable of providing the desired services. Tubelines, a private 
provider, after being months behind schedule, eventually declared bankruptcy (Hall, 
2012, p. 22). Tramlink, an electronic ticket service provider, refused to cooperate 
with a new ticketing system that would have increased the number of passengers, 
but not the monetary profit for the company (EPSU, 2012), thus showing the inability 
to act on behalf of an public service ethos and the creation of positive externality for 
society such as reduced emissions due to an increased use of public transport. The 
authorities finally decided to terminate the contract with Tramlink after two failures of 
the ticketing system, “affecting hundreds of thousands of passengers for hours”, had 
occurred. The secretary of state for transport concluded that the “failure let down 
Tube travellers, London Underground and taxpayers” (United Kingdom-House of 
Commons, 2008, p.3).  In the end, it was the conservative major of London himself, 
Boris Johnson, who argued and pushed for an insourcing of these services (United 
Kingdom-House of Commons, 2008; Halmer and Hauenschild, 2012, p. 53-54). One 
must note, that the decision to re- municipalise was clearly non-ideological. It had 
been the labour party who had originally pushed for privatization (Halmer und 
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Hauenschild, 2012, p. 53). This and the fact that a conservative major and his local 
authorities were responsible for remunicipalisation, shows that the ideological 
boundaries between left and right politicians with regards to privatisation (Newman 
and Clarke,2009 p. 3), were crossed in light of drastic operational failure of an 
service, as the tube, that is cherished and which’s value is one of fulfilling a public 
interest. This type of remunicipalisation is thus, in contrast to Type 5 and 6, non-
ideological and rather independent of party politics and public management 
ideologies. In both cases, the municipalities had to intervene in to prevent greater, 
considerable disruption to services and public goods such as water and transport, 
that are, if not a basic human necessity, of vital importance to the functioning of 
complex, urban societies.  The municipal governments played the leading role, thus 
constituting this type of remunicipalisation, for several reasons.  
First of all, the municipal governments, being democratically elected on behalf 
of the citizens and voters, have the inherent responsibility to assure, or at least strive 
for the fulfilment of what has been coined the “public interest”. Without engaging in 
the theoretical, contentious debate of what actually constitutes and how to derive the 
public interest, as this would deviate from the focus of this paper, it can be assumed 
that public services are of interest to the wider public and not only to certain 
fractions, groups of citizens or individual consumers. They are so, as stated earlier, 
per definition and have been regarded as such by societies in contemporary 
democracies for a long time. Public utilities and services have been important 
instrument for the development of the modern welfare state since the nineteenth 
century (Wollman and Marcou, 2010, p 5).  The fact that the provision of public 
services is necessary, though this is obviously open to political deliberation within 
societies (Newman and Clarke, 2009, p. 2), is thus currently agreed upon.  The 
discussion revolving around privatisation and remunicipalisation is thus 
fundamentally concerned with the question of how these services are best provided 
and not if they should be provided.  The rise of the “New Public Management” in the 
1980’s and the search for alternative service delivery (Ohnmeg and Grant, 2008 ,p. 
476) does therefore not detach the state from its fundamental responsibility of 
ensuring that these services are somehow provided, be it through public or private 
operations. The concept of the “enabling state” (orig.: “Gewährleistungsstaat”), 
seeking to overcome the dualism between state and market (Concalves,2008 p. 4-
5), is based on such reasoning, thus illustrating the reasons for involvement of the 
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municipal government, and argues that “one of the main purposes of the Enabling 
State is to guarantee the existence and supply-in an adequate extent and throughout 
the territory, of those services of general economic interest” [Conclaves, 2008, p. 8 ). 
This concept can also be applied to the municipal level (Trapp, 2004, p. 9-11), 
especially in federalist systems, where local governments have considerable 
responsibilities.  The municipality, if not functioning as the provider of the public 
services due to the previous privatisation, takes on the role of “ensuring or 
guaranteeing that market operation and companies’ performance develop in 
accordance with certain previously defined aims and objectives (of public interest)” 
(Concalves,2008, p. 6). It might be debateable to what extent other aims, such as 
the desire for local employment as described in Type 6, have to be guaranteed by 
the state. However, it is clear, that the local municipality in Atlanta could only 
guarantee an adequate, sanitary provision of water to its citizens through operating 
the water utilities itself, and that it was mandated by its electorate to do so seeing the 
public value of fulfilling basic human needs such as clean and sanitary drinking 
water. The bankruptcy of the maintenance provider Metronet in London or the 
insolvency of a subsidiary of Suez that was operating the water utilities in Antalya, 
Turkey (Hall, Lobina and Coral, 2010, p. 7), show that the municipality is literally 
forced to act as a safety net in case of private failure, as it can’t risk the complete 
non-provision of an essential public service. Conceiving the government to be the 
leading institution within the state, also on the municipal level, therefore explains why 
the government and the ruling political parties cannot tolerate significant failures and 
disruptions of public services. Doing so would fundamentally undermine their 
legitimacy and self-conception as representatives of citizens and their electorate. 
Local governments and democratic political parties, independent of their political 
ideology, can therefore normally be expected to react to significant private failure 
with swift solutions, such as e.g. remunicipalisation, thus constituting this empirically 
constructed type of remunicipalisation.   
Secondly, local municipalities are expected to be the dominant actor of 
“operative failure remunicipalisation” as the have the advantage of superior 
knowledge in comparison to the civic society. Local municipalities, in their role as a 
guarantor, perform monitoring and conduct inquiries into the quality of privatized and 
outsourced services (Trapp, 2004, p. 10-13). They are thus first aware of potential 
problems with the private provision of services, such as the increased presence of 
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multi-resistant germs in Welsh hospitals that had outsourced cleaning services (Hall, 
2012, p. 23). Such information does eventually become public. It does, however, 
take time for the issue to reach a degree of salience in the media that is sufficient to 
trigger and uphold civic engagement and actions for remunicipalisation or other 
countermeasures. Some aspects of the failure of the PPP in London, such as the 
failure of the ticketing system “Oyster Card”, are within the domain of the visible for 
the consumer and the civic society. An extensive, long term failure, combined with 
the inactivity of the local municipality, which clearly wasn’t the case with the cases 
studied, could therefore also theoretically trigger protests, petitioning and other forms 
of public participation by the civic society, as described in Type 1.  On the contrary, 
other failures, such as the incapability of Metronet to maintain the tube system or the 
slow, but dangerous deterioration of health standards in Welsh hospitals have rather 
long term effects and are intangible to most of the public. The upcoming bankruptcy, 
hence failure, of the Metronet had been anticipated by authorities months in advance 
as the company had tried to renegotiate the terms and conditions of the PPP 
contract (EPSU, 20012, p. 4-5) once the lack of congruency between public and 
private expectations had become apparent (William,2010, p. 6-9). This thus gave the 
authorities the chance of considering the possibility of remunicipalisation well in 
advance. Moreover, the technical and professional knowledge required to judge to 
what extent remunicipalisation is suitable to counter the failure of private providers, is 
obviously most often located with the actor responsible for monitoring, hence the 
municipal government and therefore not as accessible to the wider public.  
Summarizing, municipal governments, as elected representatives, do fulfil 
their responsibility of acting on behalf of the public interest through re-municipalising 
essential services, which’s default of provision do have or would have created 
significant disturbance for society that are beyond an decrease in individual 
economic utility and consumer satisfaction.  The clear majority of cases where 
operative failures have been the main cause for remunicipalisation are handled by 
the municipal government directly, hence constitute Type 2, rather than evoking the 
involvement of citizen initiatives as in Type 1.  
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Type 3:  Civic society initiating and pressing ahead with remunicipalisation 
due to high prices for consumers and excessive profits of privates  
 
This type of remunicipalisation is based on cases where high prices for 
consumers and profits for privates, hence economic considerations, are essentially 
the cause for remunicipalisation. It differs from type 4, through the fact that 
remunicipalisation was mainly initiated, perpetuated, and sometimes even decided, 
by an extensive involvement of the civic society, and partially by politicians from 
opposition parties. Citizen’s initiatives thus managed to transform the privatisation 
related problems of high consumer prices into a salient issue. The presence of the 
issue within the mass media and the public deliberation revolving around the 
advantages of municipal provision of the public service are key determinants for the 
decision in favour of remunicipalisation. The case of water provision and sanitation 
services in Grenoble, France, will exemplify and illustrate this type and serve as case 
studies to analyse why the civic society, rather than the municipal government itself, 
was key to the process.  
Grenoble was the first French city to re-municipalise its water and sanitation 
provision after 25 years of experiencing very high water prices. (Hall, Lobina and 
Terhorst, 2013, p. 197). The local audit court estimated the total excess cost for 
citizens and consumers to be roughly 1,000 million for the period of private provision 
between 1989 and 2014 (Hall and Lobina, 2001, p. 7). The private contractor 
COGESE used dubious water price indexing techniques, later declared illegal by the 
courts, and manipulated their accounting, incurring debts on paper, while actually 
distributing dividends to its shareholder. Moreover, the company subcontracted 
services to another subcontractor of its parent Company Suez at extremely high 
prices, thus extracting profits (Hall and Lobina, 2001, p. 7-8). The practices are a 
particular extreme example of perceived fraudulency, and have therefore, besides 
causing high water prices, also triggered the high degree of public outcry and 
opposition towards this private provider. This could be a potentially explanation for 
why the civic society was as involved, hence making it a Type 3 case,  while it wasn’t 
in the remunicipalisation of water services in Paris, belonging to Type 4 and 
explained later, where the private provider refrained from illegal practices.  The city 
council, hence the municipal government, had renegotiated terms and conditions of 
the contract with COGESE in 1996, but had only managed to achieve minor, and 
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ironically, even partially less favourable outcomes for consumers and the 
municipality (Source B, p. 8). The failure of the municipal government to act on 
behalf of its citizens therefore explains that “the crucial push for a real 
remunicipalisation in the end came from a citizen’s initiative and was accompanied 
by further court decisions” (Hachfeld, 2008, p. 5). The initiative “Eau Secour”, 
besides raising public awareness through analysing and publicising the legal and 
illegal practices of COGESE, is credited with causing the change of opinion in the 
city council who eventually opted for remunicipalisation of the services in March 
2000. The strong involvement of the civic society in the process of remunicipalisation 
can be tracked back to its involvement in the initial privatisation, where 
environmental and citizen groups had already campaigned for public and against 
private provision of the service (Hachfeld,2008, p. 4-5).   
Another reason for the emergence and perpetuation of such a successful 
citizen’s movement can be derived from the presence of extensive corruption among 
elected representatives of the municipality. The former major of Grenoble, who had 
personally negotiated the original privatisation contracts in 1989, was found to have 
accepted bribes from representatives of Suez in form of free flights, an apartment in 
Paris and financial aid for his election campaign. He was sentenced to imprisonment 
and large fines (Hachfeld, 2008, p. 4-5). This rather noteworthy case of corruption 
had two effects: First of all, it enhanced awareness of the situation of the private 
provision and the related issues,as it clearly made for a stirring story in the media 
and within the public debate.  Secondly, it directly delegitimized the municipal 
government, thus lowering trust in the representative elements of the municipal 
democracy in Grenoble. The successful participation of the public in this case, can 
thus be interpreted as a corrective within the political system. Notably, corruption and 
the accompanied public outcry was not an issue in the Type 4 cases of Paris and 
Potsdam, which both had no significant public participation from the civic society 
during the process of remunicipalisation. The remunicipalisation in Grenoble, being 
representative of Type 3, therefore hints at the fact that certain intervening, thus 
necessary, though not sufficient, conditions may determine if the civic society or the 
local municipality, as in Type 4, are reacting to overcharging and excessive private 
profits. The typology, in this case, proofs to be suitable framework for a preliminary 
investigation into why certain cases fall into certain types, in addition to the main 
purpose of describing and structuring the phenomena of remunicipalisation. Further 
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research, such as comparative study between Type 3 and Type 4 cases, obviously 
employing new empirical examples, could expatiate the assumption that variables 
such as corrupt politicians significantly influence the degree of the civic engagement 
in the process of remunicipalisation. Summarizing, the above mentioned case of 
Grenoble demonstrates that citizens can, and have become involved in countering 
high prices and private profits, though the number of cases fitting this type is 
significantly lower in comparison to the Type 4.  Factors such as media coverage 
and dissatisfaction with corrupt officials have triggered and perpetuated the 
involvement of ordinary citizens.  
 
 
Type 4: Municipal governments opting for remunicipalisation due to financial 
and efficiency considerations 
 
This type is characterized by a municipal government, as the actor, promoting 
and implementing remunicipalisation due to the municipals ability to provide the 
public service in a more cost-efficient manner in comparison to the private provider. 
Remunicipalisation is thus a rational choice that maximises the economic utility of 
consumers and the municipality. The savings from a more cost-efficient public 
provision of the goods and services are then used to consolidate and reduce 
pressure on the municipal budget or to lower tariffs and prices for consumers.  This 
is possible as the public ownership and provision of public services, especially 
concerning natural monopolies such was water, can be more cost effective in 
comparison to private, and profit orientated companies. These cases are a direct 
countermotion to the process of materially privatizing or outsourcing a public service 
for the same goal. Two decades of experiences with the privatization of public 
services contest the claim that markets and private providers are naturally more 
efficient than state owned providers (Warner, 2010, p. 37; Wollman,2013b, p. 48; 
Wollmann and Marcou,2010, p. 255; Hachfeld,2008, p. 1). While this is true for 
sectors such as telecommunication (Ambrious, 2012, p. 102), it clearly isn’t with 
regards to all cases and sectors, as this type of remunicipalisation will demonstrate. 
In the following, some “typical” cases used to derive this type of remunicipalisation 
will be described. Moreover, the cases will illuminate how municipal governments, 
though also re-municipalising  to reduce prices on behalf of the consumers, also 
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have their own agenda of securing surpluses from public utilities as a source of 
income. 
The remunicipalisation of water services in Paris exemplifies how a municipal 
government can be capable of operating more cost efficient than a private provider, 
thus achieving a reduction in tariffs for consumers. The citizens of Paris had been 
provided with drinking water by a subsidiary of Veolia, Euax de Paris, and a 
subsidiary of Suez, Eau et Force-Parisienne des Euax, for over 25 years at the point 
of remunicipalisation in January 2010 (Valdovins, 2012 p. 111). During that time, the 
water prices had increased by 265 %, with the inflation only rising by 70.5 % in the 
same period. An audit concluded that “the satisfactory service does not justify such 
as high cost” (Pigeon,2012b p. 27). This type of remunicipalisation is thus 
demarcated from cases in Type 1, as there is no operative failure, but actually 
satisfactory service in terms of the quality of the product and/or service.  The private 
provider’s inability to provide the lowest possible cost for consumers, which had 
been the proclaimed aim of privatisation of these services, can result from a focus on 
shareholder value, hence the necessity to extract profit, and/or imperfect market 
situations. In the case of Paris, Veolia itself admitted that Eaux de Paris was a “very 
profitable company” (Pigeon, 2012b, p. 27). Eventually, the provision under a newly 
created, publicly owned utility resulted in a reduction of operation cost of € 35 million 
during the first year, which was then quickly passed onto the consumers through an 
8 % reduction of water tariffs (Piegeon, 2012b, p. 34). The savings for consumers 
have been estimated to total 76 million for the period of 2011 to 2015 (Le strat, no 
date). The citizens of Paris, in contrast to Type 3 cases, were not actively involved in 
the process of remunicipalisation through campaigning (Piegeon, 2012b, p. 37). The 
articulation and enforcement of the benefits of a public provision of water had been 
one of the main campaign manifestos of the major Delanoe and his left-wing 
coalition. After coming to power, his administration immediately established a special 
unit that dealt with policing and monitoring of private providers of public services (Le 
strat, no date). Overall, the “strong commitment of Parisian public authorities” is an 
excellent example of how municipal governments can foster the reclaiming of public 
services on behalf of the citizens interest, such as a reduction in prices for basic 
goods such as water, thus fulfilling the proscribed of representing and serving their 
electorates and the general public’s interests.  
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The remunicipalisation of electricity grids in Münsterland, Germany, 
demonstrates that municipalities also buy back and operate infrastructure in order to 
generate an extra source of income. In 2013, the municipalities of Münsterland, after 
5 years of preparation, founded a municipal owned grid company, which sought to 
buy back the electricity grid from RWE, a multinational company, in order to profit 
from the utilization charges imposed on electricity providers, thus securing a “slice of 
the electricity cake” (Klaus, 2013). This process, thus this type of remunicipalisation 
in general,  is catalysed by the fact that municipalities have accumulated a significant 
amount of debt, thus making it necessary to strive for additional sources of incomes 
apart from traditional forms such as taxation (Menger and Müller-Kirchenbauer,2012 
p. 55) . It is therefore, first of all, the responsible bureaucrats and representatives of 
local municipalities that investigate this option, rather than the public itself. The 
municipalities, being public institutions, have the advantage of access to borrowing 
at a lower cost than their private competitors (Klaus, 2013). The gains of a regular 
income from charges can therefore outweighs the financial obligations, such as 
interest payments for borrowing used to finance the initial remunicipalisation of the 
service or asset (Menger and Müller-Kirchenbauer,2012, p. 55). While it is too early 
to judge the success of the long term endeavour of extracting profits from the re-
municipalized electricity grid in the Münsterland municipalities, one must recognize 
the legitimate criticism of this type of remunicipalisation. Hall righteously points to the 
examples of the Baden-Wurttemberg’s, a federal state in Germany, repurchasing of 
the electricity supplier EnBW. In this case, though it did not directly concern a 
municipality, the profits from the company were supposed to allow for a reduction of 
regular taxes. However, the planned compulsory shut down of nuclear energy plants 
will drastically affect the profitability of EnBW (Hall, 2012, p. 7). The ability to secure 
profit from a public, entrepreneurial involvement in the public service market, is thus 
questionable but also understandable from the perspective of a local municipal 
government 
The rather insignificant, therefore less politicized insourcing of certain 
previously outsourced tasks pertaining public services and the local administration 
such as IT, gardening of public parks, or community housing management, is also a 
form of remunicipalisation that allows municipalities to cut spending and/or utilize its 
financial resources alternatively. In Somerset, UK, the municipal government and 
administration decided to dissolve a joint venture with IBM, which was supposed to 
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deliver relevant IT services with total savings of up to 192 million over ten years. In 
the end, the joint-venture had to be bailed out due to significant losses, and thus 
parts of it are in the process of being taken back in-house as a means of cost 
reduction for the municipality (Ballard, 2012). In a similar manner, the council 
housing management in Sheffield and Islington, UK,  has been taken back in-house 
as “we could make some savings in the long run, which meant more funding would 
be available” (Birch, 2011). Remunicipalisation has also been a successful tool for 
reducing operation and maintenance cost of public buildings and infrastructure in 
Hannover, Germany (Schrade, 2013, p. 110- 117).   Small-scale remunicipalisation, 
similar to more notable and far-reaching cases such as in Paris, is therefore also 
possible through the fact that the private providers and sub-contractors are 
sometimes inefficient and more costly, thus providing a considerable financial 
opportunity for the municipality.   
The typology can be criticized with reference to the construction of type 4. The 
abovementioned cases of remunicipalisation differ significantly in their cause in 
comparison to Type 1+ 2 and 5+6, where ideological and operational failure were the 
main reasons. The necessity for heterogeneity between Type 4 and the others with 
regards to the variable cause, is thus given (Sodeur, 1974, p. 119), However, one 
may contest a sufficient homogeneity of the property values, hence the different 
causes, within Type 4.  On the one hand, the abovementioned examples show that 
some municipalities use remunicipalisation to consolidate their budget either through 
an extraction of profits, which had been transferred to private shareholders while in 
private hands, or through reducing cost of municipally financed task and services. 
On the other hand, some municipalities, as in Paris, directly transfer the monetary 
benefits of public provision to the consumer through lowering prices and tariffs.  
Nevertheless, these somewhat different motivations, hence causes for 
remunicipalisation, have been merged, thus treated as one due to the following 
considerations.   
The primary objective of this descriptive typology is the reduction of a complex 
reality, thus structuring the phenomena of remunicipalisation in a simple and 
analytical highly functional manner. Expanding the property space would have been 
contrary to this aim. Barton and Larzarsfeld explicitly support such a reduction of the 
property space as it eases the analysis of the relationship between the dimensions 
(cited in Kelle,1999, p 101),  hence the causes and actors of remunicipalisation in 
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this typology. Indeed, the underlying motivation of the municipalities are similar after 
all. Both, the consumer price reduction and the income generation, in the end, are in 
favour of the municipal government and thus explain why a municipal government 
would push for remunicipalisation. Lowering of consumer prices, or a better quality 
service, benefits the citizens in a direct and quick manner. This, as in the example of 
Paris, is inherently in the interest of accountable political parties and the 
corresponding minsters and bureaucrats as it provides them with political capital for 
re-election. This is especially valid if remunicipalisation and lowering of prices, as in 
Paris, has been a declared goal during election campaigns. Moreover, the revenues 
from public service utilities, or a reduction of the cost of the provision of a public 
service, can also be used to lower taxes, or to cross-finance other public services. 
Empirical evidence from Germany suggest that municipalities indeed use the 
surpluses from public service utilities, mostly regarding electricity and waste 
disposal, to cross-finance other services such as Public transport, which usually 
operate with a deficit (Menges and Müller-Kirchenbauer,2012 p. 54-55). The 
remunicipalisation of waste collection in Bergkamen, Germany, underlines that 
municipalities can simultaneously lower consumer prices and derive profit from the 
public service utility. Waste collection charges were lowered by 12 %, street cleaning 
by 25 %, and water cost remained unchanged, (Schäfer, 2012, p. 76) while the 
municipality extracts a yearly profit of € 3 million due to remunicipalisation (Hall, 
2012, p. 13). The underlying cause, the possibility of a more cost-efficient provision 
of the public service through public hands, is thus equal for all the cases of this type 
of remunicipalisation. Municipalities then have the choice to utilize the financial 
benefits for the purpose they determine to be of greatest value for citizens in the long 
and or short run. All sorts of economic and financial benefits, as a cause, are thus 
what constitutes this type of remunicipalisation.  
 
 
Type 5 Civic society calling for and enforcing remunicipalisation as a mean to 
achieving ideological aims such as environmental protection. 
 
This type is characterized through a strong participation of the civic society, 
non-governmental organisations and trade unions in the process of re-municipalising 
public services and infrastructure as a mean of achieving aims that can be classified 
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to be mainly ideological. The main example is environmental protection. They differ 
significantly from Type 3 and 4 as the causes for remunicipalisation are non-
economical and sometimes even accompanied by considerable financial risks in 
comparison to the continued provision through a private provider.  The impact of 
citizen initiatives on the repurchasing of electricity grids in Hamburg and Berlin will 
illustrate this type and, secondly, provide a first explanation into why citizens are 
likely to utilize remunicipalisation as a mean of achieving ideological aims such as 
climate protection and the declared energy transformation.   
The case of Berlin and Hamburg, though Berlin was unsuccessful in the end, 
exemplify how citizen initiatives are able to politicise the perceived issue of private 
ownership and public service delivery, promote its discussion within the public 
sphere, and attempt to enforce remunicipalisation against the will of the municipal 
government by means of direct democratic instruments such as binding referenda.  
The desire to utilize the electricity grids and the public utility as a mean of producing 
renewable energy, thus combating climate change and supporting the energy 
transformation in Germany, was especially outstanding. In Berlin, the aims of the 
civic initiative “Berliner Energietisch”, was to provide a “democratic, ecological, and 
socially minded provision with energy” (Halmer and Hauenschild, 2012, p. 34). The 
main aim of the publicly owned electricity utility would have been to provide 
electricity, long distance heating, etc. to the citizens of Berlin using only renewable 
energy sources (Berliner Energietisch,2013; Landesabstimmungsleiter Berlin, 2013, 
p.3-4 ). The initiative “Unser Hamburg-unser Netz”, which had promoted and initiated 
the successful, binding referendum on the question of re-municipalising the 
electricity grid in Hamburg, also emphasized the importance of public ownership of 
the local electricity grid as a mean of developing the usage of renewable energies 
and thus protecting the climate (Unser Hamburg-Unser Netz,2013; Menges and 
Müller-Kirschenbauer, p. 59)   
The significant role of the civic society and the usage of direct-democratic 
instruments, such as referenda, is essentially a reaction to the municipal 
government’s inactivity and opposition with regards to the usage of 
remunicipalisation, hence the possibilities of a public provision of an service, as a 
method of achieving ideological aims such as the fostering of renewable energy and 
climate protection. In Berlin the ruling government, a coalition of conservatives 
(CDU) and social democrats (SPD), openly opposed the idea of remunicipalisation 
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and thus, campaigned for a No-vote in the referendum.  Both parties opposed on the 
grounds of “great financial risks to the tax payers” (Zykla, 2013). The idea of re-
municipalising the electricity grid was also opposed by Hamburgs ministry of finance, 
which warned of the unforeseeable financial risk associated with the purchase price 
of € 2 billion. Moreover, the major of Hamburg criticized that the remunicipalisation of 
the electricity grid would not increase the use of renewables or foster environmental 
protection in any other way. (Rickens and Kwasniewski, 2013 ). For further critique of 
using remunicipalisation to achieve energy transition related goals see Hansen and 
Grau (2013, p. 140-150) and Schroer (2013). 
 This type of remunicipalisation is thus based on the divergent views of 
citizens on the one hand, who accepted certain economic risk in exchange for an 
increased environmental effort within their community, and the municipal government 
on the other, which is opposed to the idea. The public’s empathize on ideological 
aims, rather than economic considerations, is most visible in the case of Boulder, 
where environmentally concerned citizens voted to raise their own taxes to finance a 
multi-million dollar feasibility study into the suitability of remunicipalisation as a mean 
of fulfilling the town’s environmental goals (Cardwell, 2013). These cases are thus 
clearly distinct from those in Type 1 and 3.  Without judging the validity of the 
arguments surrounding the possible benefits of the repurchasing of electricity grids in 
general, the marginal result of the referendum in Hamburg, where 50.9 % of all 
participants voted for remunicipalisation (Uken,2013), and the referendum in Berlin, 
where 83 % of participants voted for the remunicipalisation but narrowly failed to the 
quorum of 25 % (Wahlen Berlin, 2013), verify that the public’s opinion on this type of 
remunicipalisation is divided, but sometimes also contrary to the opinion of elected 
representatives.  
 This type of remunicipalisation therefore underlines the argument of the 
importance of direct democratic elements and public participation when it comes to 
deriving and implementing the public will of a society. Comparing the ratio of of 
cases between Type 3 and Type 4 and between Type 5 and Type 6, one notices that 
the civic society, when speaking out for remunicipalisation, was predominantly 
concerned with pursuing environmental aims, whereas municipal governments often 
pushed for remunicipalisation for economic considerations and financial gains. The 
distribution of elements, hence cases, within the property space, therefore hints at an 
existence of a systematic relationship. The fact that all four cases of this type 
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concern the energy sector, indicates the issue of climate change and energy 
transformation is contemporarily important within the civic society.  The typology is 
mainly descriptive and is used for structuring and gaining an overview over the 
phenomena of remunicipalisation. Cases were therefore not selected on the basis of 
being representative for the entire basic population of remunicipalisation case. This 
suspected systematic relationship would need to be analysed in a more focused, 
probably also country specific study using a representative sample of cases.  
Summarizing, this type of remunicipalisation is well consolidated in an empirical 
sense, as it is based on a well-known and nationwide discussed cases of 
remunicipalisation.  
 
 
Type 6: Municipal governments pushing for remunicipalisation for ideological 
reasons such as socio-political considerations and environmental concerns 
   
Municipal governments and administrations also use remunicipalisation, thus 
the regained influence over the provision of the public service, as a method of 
perusing goals that are primarily of ideological and socio-political nature.  Providing 
secure and long-term jobs with high standards of employment can be a key 
motivation for municipalities to consider regaining control over of their public 
services. The state is still considered to be a very good employer in comparison to 
the private sector, although this image has been damaged due to deteriorating 
standards and an increased use of flexible and short-term contracts (Schneider, 
2013, p. 148-160). Nevertheless, this type of remunicipalisation can be described as 
a countermovement to the reduction of workforces in the public service sector, that 
had occurred in many OECD countries after the privatisation of the public services 
(Schmidt, 2013, p.16-17). The Remunicipalisation of the public transport in Kiel, 
Germany, and the touristic and cultural services in Rome, Italy, will illustrate this type 
with regards to employment considerations. Moreover, the remunicipalisation of the 
public utility in Tübingen, Germany, shows that the facilitation of environmental 
goals, as most visible in Type 5, can also be a main agenda for some local 
administrations and the elected representatives.  
Public services such as the public transport system in Kiel, do not only 
provide services that are essential for the functioning of modern societies, but also 
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provide an opportunity for the municipal government to control and safeguard 
employment. Local politicians and parties, such as a left coalition in Kiel, re-
municipalised in order to sustain approximately 600 jobs that had been under threat 
due to continued delivery of a private provider (Halmer and Hauenschild, 2012, p. 
52). The ruling “SPD”, the social democrats, declared that „ the decision of the town-
hall has secured the future of the KVG and all of its employees” (SPD-Kiel, 2010).  
Other left parties, such as “Die Linke”, though not part of the governing coalition, 
emphasized that remunicipalisation was “without an alternative” and that a raising of 
the income of the KVG, hence most likely a rise in ticket prices, should be 
considered before discussing any possible reduction of labour costs (Linksfraktion-
Kiel, 2009). They thus prioritizes the importance of good employment conditions 
within state owned companies over economic efficiency considerations in the 
delivery of the service to the public. It is at this point, where municipalities have to 
consider possible conflicting goals with regards to Type 4, and thus make a 
conscious decision over the priorities of public service delivery.  
The municipalities experience with the outsourcing of cultural services in 
Rome had also been negative in regards to the employment conditions. The 
municipality, as an result of precarious employment conditions and redundancies of 
workers due to restructuring of the private provider, (European Union- EPSU, 2008,  
p. 50), therefore utilized remunicipalisation as an method of not only securing better 
quality service, but also to provide stable, local employment. The publicly owned 
company Zetema was set up and eventually won most of the tendering for major 
cultural related services in public museums, etc. The formerly privately employed 
workers were transferred to the public company which “could offer them better 
employment contracts and put them on a proper job and pay grading system” 
(European Union,EPSU, p. 51).  
 The remunicipalisation of the electricity grid in Tübingen provides evidence 
that local governments also consider and perpetuate remunicipalisation due to 
environmental concerns.  The city of Tübingen repurchased numerous electricity 
grids from neighbouring municipalities in order to foster the use of renewable 
energies (Holtgrave, 2009, p. 7). The major Boris Palmer, member of the 
“Bündnis90-Die Grünen”, declared that purchasing the electricity grids would provide 
the publicly owned utility with a direct access to the electricity consumer (Baguette, 
2013, p.4). In this case, the local government became involved due to its 
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programmatic and ideological preferences.  The major, being member of a party with 
a focus on environmental goals, therefore re-municipalised on behalf of his 
electorate and thus a majority of citizens. The congruency of aims and preferences 
between elected representatives and the citizens is thus what separates this case 
from Type 5 cases of remunicipalisation.   
 
6. Conclusion and summary of findings  
 
The investigation into the process of remunicipalisation of public services in 
OECD countries has depicted the existence of various underlying causes and a 
varying degree of involvement of citizens and municipal governments. Constructing 
an analytically reduced property space of the dimensions “cause” and “actor”, has 
been the main contribution of the descriptive typology and this paper. The 
differences and similarities between individual cases of remunicipalisation, once a 
complex and rather unclear reality, can now be descripted in a simplified and 
functional manner through conceiving of six distinct and heterogeneous types of 
remunicipalisation:  
Type 1 and 2 both have their origin in operative and technical failures of 
private providers. These types of remunicipalisation reflect the inability of some of 
the private providers to deliver the promised services with a certain degree of quality. 
The engagement of citizens has been confined to one case, as the majority of 
municipal governments fulfil their responsibility of ensuring the provision of basic 
goods and services through swift remunicipalisation in the case of private sector 
failure. Type 3 and 4 remunicipalisation are defined by the economic and financial 
benefits of public ownership. These benefits can occur in form of reduced prices for 
consumers and also lead to an additional source of income for the municipality. In 
Type 3, citizens have been involved in counter steering against high prices and 
private profits, a process potentially fostered by the presence of corruption among 
elected representatives. The majority of cases constitute Type 4 as municipal 
governments are attracted to the possibility of extracting profits from public 
companies and infrastructures and/or re-municipalise to minimise the cost of 
municipally funded services. Ideological motives are at the core of Type 5 and 6. 
Redirecting public service provision towards the inclusion of ecological 
considerations has been identified as a main motive of citizen initiatives in type 5. 
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Opposing political aims and agendas of citizens and local governments have been 
shown to result in the use of direct democratic elements such as referenda. 
Moreover, municipalities have been found to safe-guard and provide employment 
and to foster environmental friendly energy production and provision, thus forming 
Type 6. 
The scope and limitations of the abovementioned findings have to be 
acknowledged in addition. First of all, the property values of the dimension of “cause” 
of remunicipalisation, hence operative failure, economic and ideological, are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive. Some cases of remunicipalisation are based on two 
or more compatible causes, such as in the case of Hamburg, in which economic 
benefits were considered in addition to ecological motives. One should therefore 
note that the typology and the cases illustrated present an idealized, best-fit version 
of reality. This inherent trade-off was considered and weighted against the functional 
usefulness of the typology. Second, the case studies employed in the construction of 
the typology are not representative of all instances of remunicipalisation of public 
services in OECD countries as they were selected on the basis of acquiring a 
diverse and contrasting causes and actors. Observations based on the distribution of 
cases are therefore only preliminary and necessitate further research.  
   Overall, the method of employing a typology has been highly successful in 
“structuring an abundance of explorative material” (Mayring cited in Kelle, 1999, p. 
44). The Common causes or remunicipalisation of public services in OECD countries 
have been reduced and summarized to be operative failures of private providers; 
economic and financial considerations; and ideological motives. The main actors 
have been identified to be the citizens and civic society, and the municipal 
governments and administrations. Their relationship is marked by agreement in most 
cases, but also by dissension, especially in regards to Type 5 and the associated 
environmental agendas of remunicipalisation. This paper, employing a total of thirty 
cases, is thus the most elaborate study of remunicipalisation so far and is valuable 
due to its descriptive and highly concise depicting of remunicipalisation in form of a 
typology.  
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